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Note
The Executive Reports, We Decide:
The Constitutionality of an Executive Branch
Question and Report Period
Alex Hontos∗
The attacks of September 11, 2001 exposed arguably the
largest intelligence failure in U.S. history. Mere weeks after
the rubble stopped smoldering—and before Americans had an
opportunity to ask their leaders questions about that day—
Congress enacted, and the President authorized, military action1 and sweeping changes in the nation’s surveillance and
anti-terrorism laws.2 In September 2002, after nearly a year of
opposition, President Bush reluctantly signed legislation authorizing an independent investigation of the attacks.3 President Bush’s signature charged the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission)
with answering some of the basic questions about the events
preceding the attacks.4 But despite a sweeping legislative mandate5 and assurances of “unprecedented”6 cooperation from the
∗ J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2003,
St. Olaf College. The author thanks Vice President Walter Mondale, Professor
David Stras, Professor Dale Carpenter, Professor Heidi Kitrosser, Sam Diehl,
Todd Olin, and Lindsey Tonsager for feedback on earlier drafts; Hayley for her
love; and his parents for making everything possible. Copyright © 2007 by
Alex Hontos.
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT
Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
3. David Firestone & James Risen, White House, in Shift, Backs Inquiry
on 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at A1.
4. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No.
107-306, tit. VI, § 602, 116 Stat. 2383, 2408 (2002) (describing the purposes of
the 9/11 Commission).
5. Congress empowered the 9/11 Commission to:
[I]nvestigate[ ] relevant facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, including any relevant legislation,
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executive branch, Congress would not be able to ask the President directly and publicly about the events leading up to September 11.7 After initially refusing,8 President Bush eventually
acceded to the 9/11 Commission’s request for an interview—but
not without conditions. The meeting was to last no longer than
three hours, include Vice President Cheney, and neither the
President nor the Vice President would take an oath.9 Perhaps
more ominous for advocates of greater government transparency, the meeting would take place behind the closed doors of
the Oval Office and no formal record would memorialize the
proceedings.10
The events of September 11, 2001 exposed the failures of
not only the U.S. intelligence apparatus, but also of the institutional mechanisms meant to ensure government transparency
and accountability. The President’s initial refusal and subseExecutive order, regulation, plan, policy, practice, or procedure . . . .
[and to] identify, review, and evaluate the lessons learned from the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, regarding the structure, coordination, management policies, and procedures of the Federal Government, and, if appropriate, State and local governments and nongovernmental entities, relative to detecting, preventing, and
responding to such terrorist attacks.
Id. § 604, 116 Stat. at 2409–10.
6. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Thomas
H. Kean, Chairman, 9/11 Comm’n, and Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chairman, 9/11
Comm’n (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/print/20040330-3
.html.
7. It is not unprecedented for a President to appear before Congress.
Presidents Lincoln and Ford voluntarily appeared to discuss the loyalty of
Mary Todd’s brothers and the pardon of President Nixon, respectively. Benton
Becker, The History of the Nixon Pardon, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 31, 46 (2000). Nor
is it unprecedented for a President to appear before an independent commission. See PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL REVIEW BD., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD IV-12 to IV-13 (1987) (President Reagan); Tim Harper,
“We Answered All Their Questions”; Bush and Cheney Testify About 9/11 but
No Recording Kept, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 30, 2004, at A1 (President George W.
Bush).
8. Philip Shenon, 9/11 Panel to Seek Testimony from Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2004, at A28 (noting that President Bush, when asked if he would
submit to questioning, responded “[p]erhaps, perhaps”).
9. Brian Knowlton, In Rare Step, Bush Goes to 9/11 Panel, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Apr. 30, 2004, at 1; see also Harper, supra note 7.
10. Knowlton, supra note 9. Although public, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice’s testimony before the Commission contained similar restrictions. The White House required the Commission to agree that Ms. Rice’s testimony would not set precedent for future testimony of executive officials and
that the Commission would not request further public testimony from any
White House official. See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 6.
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quent qualified acquiescence to the 9/11 Commission demonstrates the need for a congressional oversight mechanism
milder than the subpoena, but with more force than the present
congressional “invitation” to executive officials. This Note analyzes the constitutionality of a procedure used in many foreign
parliamentary systems: the executive branch question and report period. Part I briefly describes the question and report period in foreign parliamentary systems and reviews previous efforts in the United States to mandate such a system. Part II
describes the possible constitutional sources for a question and
report period, and identifies the most likely arguments against
it: separation of powers and executive privilege. Part III analyzes how Congress could devise a question and report period
that is grounded in the Constitution and that avoids relevant
countervailing considerations. Part IV broadly outlines the constitutionally permissible characteristics of a question and report period involving the President and Cabinet officials. Finally, this Note concludes by calling for Congress to enact an
executive branch question and report period to increase government accountability, and in so doing, to help restore Congress’s status as “first among equals”11 in the U.S. constitutional structure.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF QUESTION AND REPORT
PERIODS
A. QUESTION AND REPORT PERIODS ABROAD
Virtually all parliamentary systems provide a method for
Members of Parliament (MPs) to question the Prime Minister
and cabinet officials, either in oral or written form.12 Although
no two parliamentary systems are identical,13 the most recognizable (and widely emulated) question and report period is the
British House of Commons’ “Prime Minister’s Questions” and

11. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 110–
11 (2005).
12. See Matti Wiberg, Parliamentary Questioning: Control by Communication?, in PARLIAMENTS AND MAJORITY RULE IN WESTERN EUROPE 179, 180
(Herbert Döring ed., 1995) (“Questions to ministers as a means of eliciting information about matters within their official responsibility is a common practice in all parliaments, and one of the celebrated functions of parliament.”).
13. Id. at 184 (“[N]o two [of the eighteen parliaments studied possessed]
exactly identical questioning forms.”).
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“Question Time.”14 First developed in the late eighteenth or
early nineteenth century,15 the British practice has evolved
only procedurally in the last half century.16
The principal distinctions between Question Time and
Prime Minister’s Questions are the frequency of questioning
periods and the individuals who are asked the questions. In
Question Time, MPs propound oral or written questions on
each of the first four days of the week at designated times.17 In
a typical Question Time, the minister of each department is
obliged to come to Parliament and be available to answer MP’s
questions for a fixed period—typically thirty to seventy minutes.18 Oral questions may be answered directly or not at all;
written questions are answered—if at all—by way of publication in Hansard.19 Prime Minister’s Questions—as the name
suggests—permits MPs to question the Prime Minister directly.
As the Prime Minister does not receive the questions in advance and is available for at least thirty minutes, this event is
often viewed as the highlight of the parliamentary week.20 In
both Prime Minister’s Questions and Question Time, the
14. GEOFFREY SMITH & NELSON W. POLSBY, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND
ITS DISCONTENTS 126 (1981) (“[A]mong the few things that most foreigners
know about the parliamentary system is that there is a question hour.”). The
regular broadcast of Prime Minister’s Questions on C-SPAN in the United
States is one example of this recognition.
15. PATRICK HOWARTH, QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE 56 (1956) (placing the
accidental genesis of Question Time at November 28, 1803); Philip Norton, Introduction: Parliament Since 1960, in PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS 1, 2 (Mark
Franklin & Philip Norton eds., 1993) (asserting that “Question Time in the
House dates back . . . to shortly before the nineteenth century”).
16. See U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS FACTSHEET P1, at 3 (2005), available at http://www.parliament.uk/
documents/upload/p01.pdf. For a brief summary of these changes during the
period 1832 through 1990, see Helen Irwin et al., Evolving Rules, in PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 23, 24–27.
17. See R.L. Borthwick, On the Floor of the House, in PARLIAMENTARY
QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 73, 75; STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS, RULE 21 (2002), available at http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm200102/cmstords/27508.htm;.
18. Borthwick, supra note 17, at 86.
19. See Irwin et al., supra note 16, at 30–31. Hansard is the traditional
name for the transcripts of debate in parliamentary systems. See ERSKINE
MAY’S TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS, AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT 210 (C.J. Boulton et al. eds., 21st ed. 1989) It is roughly equivalent to
the Congressional Record in the United States. J.A. Weir, Human Rights and
Damages, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 412, 419 (2001).
20. BBC.com, Prime Minister’s Questions, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_
news/politics/82556.stm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
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Speaker of Parliament enforces time limits and the number
and propriety of questions.21
In both Prime Minister’s Questions and Question Time, the
allowable subject matter of the questions is broad, but not
unlimited.22 In most European parliaments, “the question must
fall under the responsibilities of the government or some of its
ministers.”23 In the Canadian Parliament, questions are in order as long as they are: “[1] in fact, questions . . . , [2] asked
about something for which the minister is responsible and answerable, and [3] in parliamentary language.”24 Answers by the
minister are acceptable as long as they “are relevant, in order,
and in parliamentary language.”25 A minister has the option of
refusing to reply to a question,26 as there is no formal sanction
for refusing to answer.27 However, refusing to answer a question may generate political repercussions.28
B. PROPOSED QUESTION AND REPORT PERIODS IN THE UNITED
STATES
Despite its European pedigree and the inherent differences
between parliamentary and presidential systems, an executive
branch question and report period is not a wholly foreign concept in the United States. Not long after the practice developed
in England, Justice Story recognized the viability of allowing
the “heads of departments . . . a seat . . . in the House of Representatives, where they might freely debate without a title to
vote.”29 As early as 1864, a select committee of the House of
21. Borthwick, supra note 17, at 75; Wiberg, supra note 12, at 204–05.
22. For a comprehensive digest of limitations on parliamentary questions
in the British Parliament, see generally ERSKINE MAY’S TREATISE ON THE
LAW, supra note 19, at 287–94.
23. Wiberg, supra note 12, at 204.
24. C.E.S. Franks, The “Problem” of Debate and Question Period, in THE
CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF NORMAN WARD 1, 3
(John C. Courtney ed., 1985); see also Wiberg, supra note 12, at 205 (noting
only three questions have been denied in Iceland’s parliament since World
War II).
25. Franks, supra note 24, at 3.
26. Id.
27. Cf. id. (noting that a minister can choose to “sit and ignore the question”); Wiberg, supra note 12, at 199 (noting that a minister may decide not to
answer, although this happens rarely).
28. Wiberg, supra note 12, at 199 (“It is politically intolerable to refuse to
answer.”).
29. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 869, at 605 (3d ed. Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1858) (1833);
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Representatives recommended that cabinet officers be granted
the right to answer questions and participate in floor debates.30
In 1881, a select committee of the Senate recommended a similar question and report period with cabinet officials.31 Over the
next sixty years, Presidents Wilson and Taft each advocated
some form of question and report period.32
Of these proposals, President (and later Chief Justice)
Taft’s was perhaps the most noteworthy. Taft’s proposal was
unique because it was the only proposal made by a sitting
President, and because Taft extended the invitation in his 1912
State of the Union message.33 Taft advocated that “members of
the President’s cabinet, should be given access to the floor of
each House to introduce measures, to advocate their passage, to
answer questions, and to enter into the debate as if they were
members.”34 All of these measures could be accomplished, Taft
opined, “[w]ithout any change in the Constitution.”35
Although Congress declined to take up Taft’s offer, the idea
of a question and report period resurfaced later in the twentieth century. Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee introduced a
proposal in the 1940s which was also not adopted.36 Thirty
years later, the concept received renewed support in response
to executive abuses and legislative branch failures related to
Watergate and the Vietnam War.37 Minnesota Senator Walter
Mondale’s 1973 bill, which would have required “heads of executive departments and agencies” to answer questions before

see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957,
at 296 (1957) (“[F]ar from raising any constitutional difficulties, [a cabinet official question and report period] has the countenance of early practice under
the Constitution.”).
30. H.R. REP. NO. 38-214, at 1–7 (1864).
31. S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 1–8 (1881).
32. WILLIAM H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 31
(1938); WOODROW WILSON, COMMITTEE OR CABINET GOVERNMENT? (1884),
reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 614, 634 (Arthur S. Link ed.,
1967).
33. President William H. Taft, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1912),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29553.
34. TAFT, supra note 32, at 31 (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. ESTES KEFAUVER & JACK LEVIN, A TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONGRESS
70–79 (1947).
37. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 390–92
(1973).
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the Senate,38 was the latest in a long line of proposals for a
question and report period in the United States.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES AND LIMITS FOR A
QUESTION AND REPORT PERIOD
Several constitutional provisions are relevant to a question
and report period in the United States. The Necessary and
Proper Clause and the State of the Union Clause independently
demonstrate the Framers’ intent to establish legislative primacy and to create mechanisms for executive accountability.
However, the separation of powers and executive privilege doctrines are countervailing constitutional principles that potentially restrict the ability of the legislature to obtain information
from the executive branch.
A. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
The Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause empowers
Congress “[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of
the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”39
While courts have interpreted the clause to provide Congress
with the authority for investigation and oversight of the executive branch,40 the Constitution does not expressly authorize a
question and report period. Thus, the power to mandate such a
requirement hinges on the construction of the words “necessary
and proper.”
1. Legislative Power Under the Necessary and Proper Clause
Despite creating a government of enumerated powers,41 the
Framers acknowledged the existence of a corpus of related
powers beyond the literal text of the Constitution.42 However,
38. S. Res. 123, 93rd Cong. (1973).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
40. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 197 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
41. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194–95 (1824)
(“[E]numeration presupposes something not enumerated.”).
42. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the Necessary and Proper Clause “empowers Congress to enact
laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority
to enact in isolation”); J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary
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the Framers rejected the notion that the clause creates a residuum of power unrelated to the enumerated powers.43 Rather,
its primary purpose was more limited—to facilitate the exercise
of the enumerated powers.44 Although these enabling powers
remain dormant until Congress needs (and justifies) them, the
clause presciently reflects that Congress may need to exercise
the enumerated powers in new and unforeseen ways.45
While the Framers agreed that the clause confers some
power, its scope and content was more contentious.46 The Supreme Court long ago set out the basic structure for animating
and defining these powers. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the
Court sanctioned the creation of a national bank despite the
lack of an explicit authorization among Congress’s enumerated
Article I powers.47 In determining whether the Constitution
conveyed such authority, Chief Justice Marshall proffered the
following ends/means test: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”48 Because the national bank at issue in McCulloch facilitated the exercise of other critical legis-

and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 587 (“The Necessary and Proper
Clause plainly affirmed that Congress possesses some powers not spelled out
in the text of the Constitution.”).
43. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 206 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“The propriety of a law, in a constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is founded.”);
id. at 205 (“[W]hy then was [the Necessary and Proper Clause] introduced?
The answer is, that it could only have been done for greater caution.”).
44. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]here Congress
has the authority to enact a regulation, ‘it possesses every power needed to
make that regulation effective.’” (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy,
315 U.S. 110, 118–19 (1942))); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), supra note 43, at 304–05 (“[W]herever the end is required, the means are authorised; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power
necessary for doing it, is included.”).
45. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), supra note 43, at 304–
05 (describing the “chimerical” task of a complete digest of “laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates; accomoda[ting] . . . not only . . . the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce”).
46. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 188 (2003) (describing competing
understandings of the clause among the Framers).
47. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819).
48. Id. at 421.
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lative powers, the Court upheld its creation under the clause.49
Since Chief Justice Marshall’s construction in McCulloch,
the Necessary and Proper Clause has been used to justify numerous legislative enactments.50 The Supreme Court has relied
on the clause to uphold legislation involving government taking
of private property,51 regulation of commerce,52 oversight of
public funds,53 procedure of the federal courts,54 and use of the
contempt power to investigate executive branch conduct.55 In
spite of some opposition,56 the Supreme Court has recently affirmed both the foundational understanding of the clause as fa49. Id. at 422–24.
50. See AMAR, supra note 11, at 362 (noting that during the antebellum
period “no Court opinion [with the exception of Dred Scott] had ever held that
a congressional statute flunked McCulloch’s deferential test of congressional
power”); Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some
Notes on the Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1378
(1983) (“Since the time of McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been clear that the
Clause presents no formidable barriers to legislative activity.”).
51. See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1876) (recognizing the federal government’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
take property “needed for forts, armories, and arsenals, for navy-yards and
light-houses, for custom-houses, post-offices, and court-houses, and for other
public uses”).
52. See, e.g., Houston, E.&W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport
Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914) (“[Congress] possess[es] the power to
foster and protect interstate commerce, and to take all measures necessary or
appropriate to that end, although intrastate transactions of interstate carriers
may thereby be controlled.”); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 78
(1838) (“Any offence which . . . interferes with, obstructs, or prevents such
commerce and navigation, though done on land, may be punished by congress,
under its general authority to make all laws necessary and proper to execute
their delegated constitutional powers.”).
53. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (“Congress
has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal moneys to
promote the general welfare . . . and it has corresponding authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause . . . to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that power are in fact spent for the general welfare.”).
54. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988)
(holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the federal venue statute, falls “comfortably
within Congress’ powers under Article III as augmented by the Necessary and
Proper Clause”).
55. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (“[T]he
power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function.”).
56. See, e.g., Sabri, 541 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I find questionable the scope the Court gives to the Necessary and Proper Clause as applied to Congress’ authority to spend. In particular, the Court appears to hold
that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes the exercise of any power
that is no more than a ‘rational means’ to effectuate one of Congress’ enumerated powers.”).
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cilitative (i.e., that non-enumerated powers exist, but those
powers must be bound up with an enumerated power) and the
clause’s viability as a source of legislative authority.57 These
decisions have not only broadly construed Congress’s own powers but also have “made explicit what otherwise might have
been a disputable reading of the [Constitution’s] organizing
schema: Congress stood first among equals, with wide power to
structure the second-mentioned executive and third-mentioned
judicial branches.”58
While some have viewed the terms “necessary” and
“proper” as synonymous,59 most scholars argue that each term
provides a distinct limitation on legislative authority.60 Marshall’s interpretation of “necessary” has “never been taken to
require ‘absolute necessity’; some sort of reasonable relationship between ends and means has been sufficient.”61 On the
other hand, a law is “proper” so long as it does not violate some
other constitutional mandate.62 For example, a law is not
proper for carrying into execution the Commerce Clause when
it violates the constitutional principle of state sovereignty.63
57. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (“[W]hen it enacted [the
Controlled Substances Act], Congress was acting well within its authority to
‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ‘regulate Commerce
. . . among the several States.’”).
58. AMAR, supra note 11, at 110–11; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison), supra note 43, at 350 (“In a republican government, the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.”).
59. See, e.g., JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND
SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 73 n.23 (1956) (“[O]nly one of
the Federalists made any reference to the word ‘proper’ from the necessary
and proper clause. They seemed to assume that anything was proper which
they deemed necessary.”).
60. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Original Understanding and the Unwritten Constitution, in TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: SIX ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION 145, 163–64 (Neil L. York ed., 1988) (“[L]aws passed by Congress must be both instrumentally useful in pursuing one of Congress’s delegated powers (necessary) and consistent with traditionally recognized principles of individual right (proper).”); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 275 (1993) (“The [Necessary and Proper Clause]
specifies that any laws enacted under its authority must be both necessary
and proper—in the conjunctive.”).
61. Carter, supra note 50, at 1378.
62. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 60, at 297 (“[U]nder a jurisdictional construction of the Sweeping Clause, executory laws must be consistent
with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights.”); cf. Beck, supra note 42, at 639 (describing the “conceptual and
practical difficulties” with Lawson and Granger’s propriety requirement).
63. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997); New York v.
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Marshall’s test reveals that Congress would possess “all powers
expressly listed in [the Constitution] and also anything that followed by fair, commonsensical implication.”64 The constitutional validity of a power claimed under the Necessary and
Proper Clause depends, therefore, on whether that power is an
appropriate means to exercise a legitimate end.65
2. The Necessary and Proper Clause and Investigatory Power
Absent impeachment,66 the Constitution does not expressly
authorize Congress to investigate the President, the executive
branch, or the administrative bureaucracy.67 This omission is
surprising given the importance of the inquiry power in the
British Parliament and the colonial legislatures.68 Nonetheless,
after ratification of the Constitution, Congress quickly seized
the opportunity to inquire into executive branch conduct as a
necessary component of its legislative function.
In creating the Treasury Department, the first Congress
required the Secretary of the Treasury to “report, and give information to either branch of the legislature, in person or in
writing (as he may be required), respecting all matters referred
to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which
shall appertain to his office.”69 The records of that first Congress are also filled with examples of questions directed at (and
answered by) executive officials.70 In 1792, the House of RepreUnited States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
64. AMAR, supra note 11, at 110.
65. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 636 (1882) (“‘Whenever,
therefore, a question arises concerning the constitutionality of a particular
power, the first question is whether the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it be, the question is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry
must be whether it is properly an incident to an express power and necessary
to its execution. If it be, then it may be exercised by Congress. If not, Congress
cannot exercise it.’” (quoting 2 STORY, supra note 29, § 1243, at 136)).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
67. Cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“[Congress
has] no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without
justification . . . . No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in
furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.”).
68. See RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH
15–34 (1974) (noting the importance of inquiry power in British practice and
colonial legislatures); James Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 159–68 (1926) (same).
69. An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, 1 Stat. 65, 66 (1789)
(emphasis added).
70. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 51 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (“The Secretary of Foreign Affairs [Thomas Jefferson] attended, agreeably to order, and
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sentatives initiated the first congressional investigation of executive branch conduct.71 After the country lost hundreds of
soldiers in a disastrous military campaign, the House established a committee to investigate the conduct of the executive
branch official in charge of the expedition.72 The House authorized the committee to “call for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.”73 Two
years later, the Senate directed President Washington “to lay
before the Senate the correspondences which have been had between the Minister of the United States at the Republic of
France and said Republic, and between said Minister and the
office of Secretary of State.”74
A half-century later, Congress described its authority to
investigate the executive branch as “not merely an accidental
right, but an original one, inherent in it, and not an incident of
some particular duty.”75 These investigations show the early
understanding that Congress possessed broad investigatory
powers. Notwithstanding Congress’s own view on the matter,
the Supreme Court has independently affirmed the legitimacy
of congressional investigation generally76 and investigation of
the executive branch specifically.77
Judicial recognition of the power to investigate followed
from these early parliamentary,78 colonial assembly,79 and conmade the necessary explanations . . . .”); id. at 66 (“The President of the
United States came into the Senate Chamber, attended by General Knox [the
Secretary of War], and laid before the Senate the following statement of facts,
with the questions thereto annexed, for their advice and consent . . . .”).
71. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 493–94 (1792); TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 13–29 (1955); George
B. Galloway, The Investigative Function of Congress, 21 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 47,
56 (1927).
72. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 493 (1792).
73. Id.
74. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 38 (1794).
75. H.R. REP. NO. 27-271, at 13 (1843) (emphasis added).
76. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (describing Congress’s investigatory function as “incidental to the legislative function”); Eastland v.
U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (“The power to investigate
. . . plainly falls within [the legitimate legislative sphere]”); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957) (“[A]n investigation is part of lawmaking. It is
justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process.”).
77. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927) (approving a congressional inquiry into alleged executive branch malfeasance related to the Teapot
Dome scandal because the power to “secure needed information . . . has long
been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate”).
78. Id. (describing the inquiry power as “an attribute of the power to legis-
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gressional practices.80 The Supreme Court has described the
scope of this inherent investigatory power as “broad” 81 and “as
penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact
and appropriate under the Constitution.”82 In other words,
Congress’s ability to inquire is limited only by the need to “be
related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of Congress.”83 To that end, Congress may conduct inquiries concerning “the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or
possibly needed statutes. [Congress’s investigatory power] includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.”84
Investigation, inquiry, and oversight are all intimately related
to these purposes.85
B. THE STATE OF THE UNION CLAUSE
Article II’s State of the Union Clause provides additional
authority for a question and report period. The State of the Union Clause directs the President to “from time to time give to
the Congress information of the state of the union.”86 The Supreme Court has never construed the meaning of the State of
the Union Clause, and only one federal court has cited the
clause in a published opinion.87
late” because “[i]t was so regarded in the British Parliament”).
79. Id. at 174 (noting that this power was “employed in American legislatures before the Constitution was framed and ratified”).
80. Id. at 161–68.
81. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
82. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959); see also William
P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the President,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 798 (“Congress’s power to investigate the President
. . . was to be vital and expansive.”).
83. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187; cf. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111–12 (“Since
Congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially
legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the
exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government.”).
84. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added).
85. AMAR, supra note 11, at 112 (“Though Article I did not explicitly enumerate the point, [the Necessary and Proper Clause] . . . gave each house of
Congress broad powers of investigation and oversight . . . that were necessary
and proper adjuncts to Congress’s enumerated powers to enact legislation, appropriate funds, conduct impeachments, and propose constitutional amendments.”).
86. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
87. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F.
Supp. 2d 20, 50 n.15 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated and remanded on other grounds
sub nom. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
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The dearth of judicial authority is mirrored in the legal
scholarship. Other than the acknowledgement that the State of
the Union Clause derives, in large part, from the “royal act of
communicating with [the British] parliament,”88 the clause is
“embarrassingly underexamined.”89 Vasan Kesavan and J.
Gregory Sidak argue that the clause supports an early understanding of the President as the nation’s chief lawmaker.90 Professor Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes argue that the
clause does not impede the unitary executive theory of Article
II power.91 In 1974, Professor Raoul Berger described the President’s obligations under the clause as “an unqualified duty to
inform Congress as to matters within the Executive Department.”92 While that view may stretch the clause to its outer
limits,93 the clause serves the broader purpose of communication through at least three distinct functions. First, it recognizes that the President (and executive branch officials) would
likely have superior access to information critical for legislative
policy making.94 Second, it encourages dialogue between the
executive and legislative branches by mandating communica-

88. C. ELLIS STEVENS, SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO COLONIAL AND ENGLISH HISTORY 158 (2d
ed. New York, MacMillan & Co. 1894); see also Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory
Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 15 (2002) (recognizing the State of the Union Clause was “drafted against the backdrop of the
British practice whereby the Monarch would open each session of Parliament
with a ‘Speech from the Throne’”).
89. Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 88, at 5.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1207 n.262
(1992).
92. BERGER, supra note 68, at 37.
93. Mark J. Rozell, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privilege: A Response to Berger, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 541, 555 (2000) (“In
practice, presidents have used the State of the Union address to present information that they wanted to reveal to Congress, not information that Congress compelled them to present.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions
on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 658 (1996) (describing the State of
the Union Clause as “exemplify[ing] a meeting of equals, somewhere between
a Presidential right and a Presidential duty”).
94. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F.
Supp. 2d 20, 50 n.15 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting the State of the Union Clause “presupposes superior or at least different access to information than the legislative branch”), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Cheney v.
U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
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tion “from time to time.”95 Finally, the clause underscores the
importance of transparency in a liberal democracy.96
Historically, the degree of inter-branch dialogue has been
mixed. While every President has complied with the minimum
requirements of the State of the Union Clause,97 some have engaged Congress more than others. The earliest practice involved an in-person, annual speech to Congress.98 But beginning with Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, compliance with the
clause took the form of a written declaration, a form which continued for the next 112 years.99 In 1913, Woodrow Wilson renewed the practice of delivering the message in person by addressed a joint session of Congress.100 The modern practice is a
scripted, annual speech before a joint session of Congress that
outlines the President’s agenda for the coming year.101
C. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
Congressional query of executive branch officials unavoidably implicates the doctrine of separation of powers. To ensure
the United States would remain a “government of laws and not
of men,”102 the Constitution “create[d] three distinct and separate departments—the legislative, the executive, and the judicial.”103 The separation of these departments was “not merely a
matter of convenience or of governmental mechanism.”104
Rather, the doctrine’s central purpose was to “preclude a com95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also 1 STORY, supra note 29, § 869, at 604–
05; Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51, 104 (1994); Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311, 1340 (1999).
96. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV.
1349, 1371 n.100 (2001) (observing that the State of the Union Clause was one
of several “good government” provisions promoting “transparency by requiring
the President to report on the State of the Union”).
97. The White House, From Time to Time: History of the State of the Union, http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2005/history.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2007).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Gerhard Peters, The Am. Presidency Project, State of the
Union Messages, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php (last visited Mar. 7,
2007).
102. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing the origin of the phrase in the American colonies and its role in
separation of powers).
103. O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933).
104. Id.
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mingling of these essentially different powers of government in
the same hands.”105 Put another way, no branch “ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence in the administration of their respective powers.”106 Separation of powers “does not create or grant power; it only protects powers
conferred by the Constitution.”107
While separation of powers’ principal purpose was to secure liberty, “[the Constitution] also contemplates that practice
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”108 In more recent years
the debate has shifted from foundational (and more theoretical)
understandings of separation of powers to the doctrine’s practical application to contemporary legal problems.109 The Court
has inconsistently110 alternated between two competing separation of powers approaches: formalism and functionalism.111 Ir105. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 43,
at 324 (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in
the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 43, at 349 (“In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and
in the next place oblige it to control itself.”).
106. 1 STORY, supra note 29, § 530, at 371.
107. BERGER, supra note 68, at 45.
108. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
109. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 2 (1938) (“The
insistence upon the compartmentalization of power along triadic lines gave
way in the nineteenth century to the exigencies of governance.”).
110. See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) (“There is general consensus among scholars that
the Court has exhibited a ‘split personality’ in separation of powers cases. The
Court has alternated between an anything-goes functionalist method that ‘appears to be designed to do little more than rationalize incursions by one
branch into the domain of another,’ and a rigid but principled formalist
method that almost always leads to invalidation of the challenged governmental action. There has been little explanation or apparent rationale for the
Court’s flipping between these two methods of analysis.” (footnotes omitted));
Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991
SUP. CT. REV. 225, 226 (“The Court has alternated between the formal and
functional constructions [of the doctrine] . . . .”).
111. Compare the formalism of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983),
where the Court noted that “the powers delegated to [each of ] the three
branches are functionally identifiable,” with the more functionalist approach
in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977), which
denounced President Nixon’s argument as “an archaic view of the separation
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respective of analytical approach, the separation of powers doctrine presents a potentially formidable barrier to legislative information requests.112
Although Congress’s inquiry authority is broad,113 separation of powers constrains Congress’s ability to compel information on any subject.114 In the context of legislative information
requests, as with other separation of powers inquiries, the
Court looks to “a number of factors in evaluating the extent to
which the congressional scheme endangers separation of powers principles under the circumstances presented.”115 Separation of powers imposes three general limits on the method and
scope of legislative information requests: the request must relate to the branch’s legitimate functions,116 it must not arrogate
the power of a coordinate branch,117 and it cannot impede another branch’s constitutionally prescribed functions.118

of powers as requiring three airtight departments of government.”
112. While the judiciary debated competing theories of separation of powers, Congress’s regulation of executive branch information continued unabated. Even the Court noted there is “abundant statutory precedent for the
regulation and mandatory disclosure of documents in the possession of the Executive Branch.” Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 445. Legislative enactments
evincing Congress’s power to compel executive branch information sharing include the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2000) (requiring
executive agencies to give notice and reasoning in rulemaking context), the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (directing executive agencies to make information available to the public), the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-579 § 3, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(2000)) (regulating the disclosure of information), Census Act, 13 U.S.C. § 8
(2000) (governing the disposition of census data), and Internal Revenue Code,
26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2000) (regulating the IRS’s use of tax information).
113. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
114. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111–12 (1959) (“Broad
as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress may
only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the Government.”). Congress is also constrained in ways unrelated to separation of powers. See Eastland v. U.S.
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15 (1975) (“We have made it clear,
however, that Congress is not invested with a ‘general’ power to inquire into
private affairs.”).
115. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857
(1986).
116. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927).
117. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Schor, 478 U.S. at
856; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
118. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996); Nixon v. Adm’r
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
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The first of these factors is unique in the legislative inquiry
context. This factor analyzes the extent to which the challenged
conduct is germane to that branch’s legitimate functions. In the
inquiry context, this limits the subject matter of a legislative
inquiry to only that “on which legislation could be had.”119 For
example, a President could decline legislative requests for information on a pardon “on the ground that the matter is solely
executive in nature and of no concern to Congress . . . .”120
The Court outlined a second separation of powers-based
factor limiting the conduct of one branch in Morrison v. Olson.121 There, the Court upheld the provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act creating an independent prosecutor to investigate executive branch conduct.122 In so holding, Chief Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that the Act did not “involve an attempt
by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the
Executive Branch.”123 Although the Act empowered Congress to
ask the Attorney General to appoint an independent prosecutor, the Attorney General had “no duty to comply with the request.”124 Because the Act did not compel compliance by executive officials or represent a congressional arrogation of power, it
withstood a constitutional challenge.125 Therefore, the extent to
which one branch controls the actions of another is a second
critical factor in the Court’s separation of powers analysis.126

119. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 177.
120. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND
THE PRESIDENT 183 (4th ed. rev. 1997).
121. 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988).
122. Id. at 696–97.
123. Id. at 694 (emphasis added); see also Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986) (“[T]his case raises no question of
the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate
branch.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam) (“The Framers
regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.”).
124. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694.
125. Id. at 695.
126. Id.; see also id. at 696 (“[T]he Act does give the Attorney General several means of supervising or controlling the prosecutorial powers that may be
wielded by an independent counsel.”). For another case drawing the line at
compulsion, yet upholding legislative efforts to control access to executive
branch conduct, see Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425,
445 (1977), which upheld the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act directing executive officials to take custody of forty-two million pages
and 880 tape recordings created during the Nixon presidency.
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The final factor is related to the second, but conceptually
distinct. The Court’s inquiry focuses on the extent to which the
legislative action “prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.” 127 Only where
the potential for disruption is present must the Court then determine “whether that impact is justified by an overriding need
to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of
Congress.”128
D. THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE
In addition to separation of powers, the legislative inquiry
power implicates a related doctrine: executive privilege. The
Supreme Court has long shielded the executive branch from inquiries related to military and diplomatic secrets.129 The subject matter and scope of presidential privileges are not, however, unqualified.130 In United States v. Nixon, President
Richard Nixon challenged a subpoena to produce materials related to the Watergate criminal investigation.131 Because the
materials were not related to national security or diplomatic
secrets, Nixon asserted that production of the materials infringed a “generalized interest in confidentiality.”132 While noting the absence of a privilege in the Constitution,133 and rejecting Nixon’s own broad construction,134 the Court nonetheless
recognized a limited privilege for communications “in perform127. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 443; see also Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (“Even when a branch does not arrogate power to itself . . . the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair
another in the performance of its constitutional duties.”).
128. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 443; see also United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (“Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the
judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve
those competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions
of each branch.”).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); Chi. & S.
Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
130. Even in the context of military and diplomatic secrets, secrecy is not
sacrosanct. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring) (“The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the
expense of informed representative government provides no real security for
our Republic.”).
131. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 688.
132. Id. at 711.
133. Id. (“Nowhere in the Constitution . . . is there any explicit reference to
a privilege of confidentiality.”).
134. Id. (“No case of the Court . . . has extended [a privilege] to a President’s generalized interest in confidentiality.”).
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ance of [a President’s] responsibilities . . . of his office . . . and
made ‘in the process of shaping policies and making decisions.’”135 Since Nixon, the Court has reiterated the extraordinary and limited nature of executive privilege.136
III. ANALYSIS
This Part considers two constitutional sources for the question and report period: the Necessary and Proper Clause, and
the State of the Union Clause. Pursuant to these clauses Congress can, by statutory enactment, create a constitutional executive branch question and report period. This period could be
crafted to avoid separation of powers concerns and to recognize
the validity of executive privilege.
A. A QUESTION AND REPORT PERIOD IS A NECESSARY AND
PROPER EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
A question and report period satisfies Chief Justice Marshall’s ends/means test from McCulloch because it is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative function (necessary) and
does not offend other constitutional precepts (proper). A question and report period is necessary because its central purpose
is to gather information (to formulate public policy, inform the
public, or exercise oversight). Additionally, a question and report period is proper because it need not offend other constitutional principles, namely separation of powers and executive
privilege.
As a threshold matter, the enumerated power to which the
question and report period attaches is the entire bundle of
enumerated powers in Article I, because, as the Supreme Court
has recognized, information-gathering is a necessary aspect of
the effective exercise of the general “legislative power.”137 This
general legislative power necessarily subsumes the specific leg-

135. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977) (quoting
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708, 711, 713).
136. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 389 (2004) (“Executive privilege is an extraordinary assertion of power not to be lightly invoked.”); Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 446 (“[Executive] privilege is a
qualified one.”); see also Vermeule, supra note 95, at 1340 (“[E]xecutive privilege and related protections are properly viewed as exceptions to a general
presumption that executive business should be open to public scrutiny.”).
137. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 197 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
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islative powers enumerated in the Constitution (e.g., Commerce, War, Appropriations). Though the Court’s language in
these cases is often a mix of Necessary and Proper Clause and
implied powers, the Court is unambiguous in concluding that
the power to investigate is inextricably bound up with legislative power as a whole.138 The implication of this conclusion is
that any congressional inquiry relying on the Necessary and
Proper Clause (e.g., committee hearings, a question and report
period) cannot stray from those areas in which the Congress
has the power to legislate.139
1. A Question and Report Period Is Constitutionally
Necessary
A question and report period is only necessary if it would
serve a legitimate legislative function. Given that the Court has
already affirmed the legitimacy of information-gathering,140 the
issue becomes whether a question and report period would further purposes that are related to this inquiry function. The
most significant purpose related to the inquiry function includes gathering information to legislate effectively, to educate
the public, and to robustly exercise Congress’s oversight role in
determining appropriations and program efficacy.141
a. Shape Effective Legislation
The reason for government, particularly a representative
assembly in a liberal democratic system, is to formulate and
enact public policy.142 Information forms the basis for this public policy, and therefore it is the lifeblood of representative government.143 The institutions of the U.S. government reflect this
138. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197; McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174–75.
139. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).
140. See, e.g., Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504; Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197;
McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174–75.
141. Galloway, supra note 71, at 60–64.
142. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 101 (2005) (describing the Constitution’s use of the legislature to “translate public will, determined through collective deliberation, into sound public policy”); Robert B. Seidman, Justifying
Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist Approach to the Memorandum of
Law, Legislative Theory, and Practical Reason, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 69
n.205 (1992) (describing the democratic legislature as the “ultimate source of
legitimate and authoritative policy initiatives”).
143. Cf. KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION
105 (1991) (noting that legislatures rely on committees to investigate and to
apply specialized knowledge to specific fields of legislation); Scott Ashworth,
Reputational Dynamics and Political Careers, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 444
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syllogism. Without access to information—from the public, academia, non-governmental organizations, and others—Congress
cannot create intelligent and responsive laws.144 As the administrative state has expanded,145 the executive branch has become an increasingly critical source of information.146 Because
the legislative process depends on Congress’s ability to procure
information,147 the authority to inquire must be broad and
sweeping. A question and report period recognizes the increasing importance of the executive branch qua information
source.148
Just as in parliamentary systems, in the United States a
question and report period would serve as an important forum
for Congress to quickly collect and assess information from the
executive branch to formulate public policy.149 Although a com(2005) (“[L]egislatures organize themselves to facilitate information collection
about the effects of potential policies.”).
144. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (arguing that a Congress without investigatory powers “cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change”).
145. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 634, 691 (2000) (“One statistic is worth a million words: in 1802, the
number of nonmilitary officials working for the federal government was precisely 2,597; in 1997, it was 1,872,000.”). In 2005, the federal government employed 1,754,000 full-time civilians (not including congressional, judiciary, and
postal employees). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2007, at 321 tbl.481 (Oct. 2006), available at http://www
.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/07statab/fedgov.pdf.
146. Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the
Struggle for Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 739 (2002)
(“The subjects of potential lawmaking and investigation have increased a
hundredfold since the beginnings of the nation, and it is only natural that
Congress’s need for information has paralleled that rise.”).
147. Marshall, supra note 82, at 799 (“Legislative bodies would be unable
to effectively evaluate policy alternatives and weigh competing priorities if
they could not call witnesses and otherwise inquire into complex issues. Indeed, it is often through congressional hearings and investigations that foundational ideas and insights of how to address social ills are generated.”).
148. See id. at 783 (“Congress’s dependence upon the Executive to provide
. . . information will only increase as social and economic issues become ever
more complex.”); Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2523 (2006) (noting that the executive branch has
access to “broader forms” of information in certain areas than does Congress);
Wald & Siegel, supra note 146, at 739 (describing the executive branch as “the
repository of the country’s most important information for public policy formulation”).
149. Philip Norton, Questions and the Role of Parliament, in PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 194, 198 (“Questions can serve to elicit information for a variety of purposes: for the benefit of Members . . . their con-
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plete understanding of public policy has never been a prerequisite for crafting legislation,150 providing the legislator with a
broad information-gathering mandate is nevertheless important (even if only as a normative matter). In other words, where
Congress “does not itself possess the requisite information—
which not infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others
who do possess it.”151 Through direct or written questioning,
legislators would be able to ask the executive branch for specific information about the activities and expertise of the executive branch.152 This approach would not only better inform legislators, because each would receive a specific answer to her
inquiry,153 but also could decrease the time required to address
emerging issues.154 Instead of resorting to the non-compulsory
committee hearing or compulsory subpoena processes, Congress
would have a regular forum to direct specific inquiries at executive officials. This informing role is more than anecdotal. A survey of British MPs demonstrated the importance of the question and report period as a tool for information gathering.155 Of
those MPs surveyed, over half (55%) found oral questions useful in discovering hard-to-get information, while almost all
(97%) found written questions useful in discovering the
same.156 Legislative questioning is but one means to quickly
expose Congress to expert data and analysis available only
from the administrative bureaucracy.

stituents, their party, and for particular groups.”).
150. Cf. W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring
Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 404
(1992) (“Legislators rarely read the entire text of a bill on which they vote, and
sometimes they do not read any of it, relying instead on committee reports,
staff summaries, and discussions and debates with other legislators.”).
151. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
152. TAFT, supra note 32, at 32 (noting that the presence of executive officials in Congress would “keep each House advised of the facts in the actual operation of the government”).
153. KEFAUVER & LEVIN, supra note 36, at 72 (“[T]here would be a great
gain in knowledge and background acquired in a manner far more economical
of time and energy than any present available method, such as plodding
through a thousand-page committee hearing.”).
154. See, e.g., Philip Giddings, Questions and Departments, in PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 123, 146 (noting that the British Question
Time “accelerated policy responses” to a public health crisis).
155. Mark Franklin & Philip Norton, Questions and Members, in PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 104, 109.
156. Id.
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b. Inform the Public
Ascertaining information to formulate public policy is one,
but not the only, legitimate purpose for a question and report
period. Like Congress’s investigatory powers generally,157 the
question and report period can serve as a means to disseminate
information to the public. As President Woodrow Wilson elegantly noted, “[E]ven more important than legislation is the instruction and guidance in political affairs which the people
might receive from a body which kept all national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion.”158 As a result, President Wilson concluded, “[t]he informing function of Congress
should be preferred even to its legislative function.”159 Stated
another way, “the American people cannot make informed ballot judgments, and express their approval or disapproval of
elected officials, if they do not know what [those officials] have
done and why.” 160
A question and report period in the United States would
better enable the voters to acquire information about their government and its leaders. In the United Kingdom, various interest and constituent groups use the answers to parliamentary
questions to educate their members and to publicize disfavored
government policies.161 Question and report periods in parliamentary systems, although not perfect, have, at the very least,
popularized political debate.162 In the United States, a question
and report period would not only educate the public about
cleavages between Congress and the executive branch, but also
157. Marshall, supra note 82, at 799 (“Congress’s power to investigate is
. . . critical to its duties to inform the public of the inner workings and issues of
government.”).
158. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 297 (1901)
159. Id. at 303.
160. Matthew Cooper Weiner, Note, In the Wake of Whitewater: Executive
Privilege and the Institutionalized Conflict Element of Separation of Powers,
12 J.L. & POL. 775, 780 (1996).
161. Philip Norton, Questions Outside Parliament, in PARLIAMENTARY
QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 176, 180 (“[Constituencies] make use of PQs as a
valuable means of identifying the particular interests of the MPs and . . . their
stance on those issues.”).
162. See Borthwick, supra note 17, at 87 (“[Question Time] has become a
spectator sport, first for the radio and now for the television audience.”);
Franks, supra note 24, at 3–4 (“The main topics [of Question Time] are often
those on the front pages of the major newspapers, or ones raised on national
television news the previous evening.”); Norton, supra note 161, at 182–83
(noting the prevalence of coverage in the broadcast media).
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between each party’s substantive views on the issues.163 While
it is true that a question and report period may involve grandstanding and partisanship,164 the wisdom and utility of a question period is for the people (via the legislature) to decide.165
And while it may involve theatrics, at least the theater is political.166 By disseminating government policies and leadership
styles throughout the public forum, a question and report period is undoubtedly a necessary component of Congress’s informing function.
c. Foster Accountability and Oversight
A question and report period is also constitutionally necessary because it is a critical component of Congress’s constitutionally mandated accountability and oversight functions. Congress undoubtedly has a legitimate interest in holding the
executive branch accountable.167 Various constitutional clauses
elevate principles of accountability to the fore of Congress’s responsibility as the chosen representatives of “We the People.”168
A question and report period will assist Congress’s accountability function in at least two principal ways: facilitating actual
oversight of executive departments,169 and improving the quality of leadership within both the legislative and executive
branches.170
First, a question and report period will assist Congress in
its oversight role, shining the light of accountability into the
163. Norton, supra note 149, at 199 (“Question Time serves to release—and
to some extent channel—the tensions and passions aroused by disagreement
between the parties.”).
164. Giddings, supra note 154, at 149 (“Question Time itself has become a
much more partisan occasion, a piece of regular political theatre.”); Norton,
supra note 149, at 195–97.
165. See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 55 (1904) (noting the people, through the electoral process, and not the courts, possess the power to
remedy “abuses committed in the exercise of a lawful power”).
166. The Senate select committee dismissed concerns about grandstanding,
noting that the “judgment by the people” will “correct any antagonism which
threatens the effective working of the government.” S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 8
(1881).
167. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2343 (2006) (“[A] crucial part of Congress’s job is keeping the Executive accountable.”).
168. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (Impeachment Clause); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (General Welfare Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2
(Advice and Consent Clause).
169. Galloway, supra note 71, at 61.
170. S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 8 (1881).
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darkest corners of the administrative bureaucracy. Congress’s
function as “guardian of the public purse,” for example, means
“the conduct of public servants, their efficiency and their integrity, must then be subject to the severest scrutiny of that organ
of the government that determines whether or not they shall
subsist.”171 The legislative bodies in parliamentary systems
share this oversight function. In a survey of British MPs, the
most frequent rationale for propounding questions during Parliamentary Questions “was in order to hold ministers accountable for their actions and those of their subordinates.”172 One
commentator went further, describing the “bureaucrat’s knowledge that he may at any time be called upon to account for his
actions” by Parliament as one of two factors ensuring that a
benevolent bureaucracy does not become a despotism.173 In the
United States, President Wilson lauded similar positive effects,
noting that in Congress “a single quick and pointed and welldirected question from a keen antagonist may utterly betray
any minister who has aught to conceal.”174 Moreover, a question and report period would allow direct questions about executive branch policies and responses to emerging problems
(e.g., natural or man-made disasters). As in the United Kingdom, more immediate oversight could correct administrative
inaction before it becomes a crisis (e.g., Hurricane Katrina).175
A question and report period is intimately related to Congress’s
constitutionally assigned oversight function.
A question and report period would also increase accountability in a related way: improving the quality of leadership
within both the executive176 and legislative branches.177 Know171. Landis, supra note 68, at 194.
172. Franklin & Norton, supra note 155, at 108; see also JOHN D. MILLETT,
THE BRITISH UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE BOARD 160 (1940) (“The most useful means of keeping the work of [an administrative program] under constant
review is through the institution of questions asked in the House of Commons.”); Cornelius P. Cotter, Emergency Detention in Wartime: The British
Experience, 6 STAN. L. REV. 238, 284 (1954) (praising Question Time as “a device for exposing inadequacies in program administration and for compelling
correction”).
173. HOWARTH, supra note 15, at 6.
174. Woodrow Wilson, Government by Debate: Being a Short View of Our
National Government as It Is and as It Might Be (Dec. 4, 1882), in 2 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 32, at 159, 218.
175. Giddings, supra note 154, at 146–48 (describing parliamentary pressure on the government).
176. SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 392 (“[A] question hour could subtly
alter the balance of [the President’s] power both as against his cabinet, whose

HONTOS_4FMT

4/16/2007 8:51:15 AM

2007] EXECUTIVE QUESTION & REPORT PERIODS

1073

ing that top officials will regularly spar with Congress over substantive matters of policy, the President might take greater
care in choosing capable (and rhetorically adroit) cabinet officials.178 Once selected, these officials would have greater incentive to know the inner-workings of their departments.179 President Taft suggested that fear of direct, public inquiry would
stimulate “a more thorough familiarity with the actual operations of [the Cabinet official’s] department.”180 Senator Estes
Kefauver and Jack Levin posited that executive officials “would
consider more deliberately their decisions and administrative
orders if they knew they might be called upon to render an official public accounting in the spotlight of an open House session.
. . . These men would have to know their departments and be
able to give the facts.”181 President Wilson put the benefit of a
question and report period as it related to Congress’s legitimate
oversight role more bluntly: “Charlatans [in either the legislative or executive branches] cannot long play statesmen successfully when the whole country is sitting as critic.”182 While these
benefits more clearly apply to oral questions, responses to written questions will also bring new scrutiny of official action.183
As a question and report period is logically related to the exercise of the enumerated powers, it satisfies the Court’s necessary
prong.

members would have the chance to acquire new visibility and develop their
own relationships with Congress and the electorate, and as against Congress,
which would have the opportunity of playing off his own cabinet against
him.”).
177. S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 8 (1881) (“[A question and report period] will
require the strongest men to be the leaders of Congress and participate in debate.”).
178. Id.
179. Richard Nixon, upon witnessing a session of the British Parliament,
described the experience as “inspiring and compelling.” He added, “I came
away with a deep appreciation and respect for the ability of the British parliamentarian to stand up during the question period and answer so effectively.
I believe that your question period is much more of an ordeal than our press
conference.” President Richard Nixon, Remarks on Departure from Britain, 1
PUB. PAPERS 149 (Feb. 26, 1969).
180. TAFT, supra note 32, at 31.
181. KEFAUVER & LEVIN, supra note 36, at 73–74.
182. Wilson, supra note 174, at 218.
183. Franklin & Norton, supra note 155, at 108–09.
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2. A Question and Report Period Is Constitutionally Proper
To serve as an adjunct to an enumerated power, a congressionally enacted question and report period also must not offend other constitutional principles.184 Because a properly
crafted question and report period need not violate separation
of powers or executive privilege, it will satisfy the proper prong
of Chief Justice Marshall’s Necessary and Proper Clause analysis.
a. Separation of Powers
Given the unique structural composition of the U.S government, separation of powers presents the most difficult constitutional issue for a question and report period. This issue is
especially relevant given the reliance on the Necessary and
Proper Clause as the source for a question and report period.
The Supreme Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence illustrates the characteristics of a question and report period that
are within (and without) the bounds of the Constitution.
First and foremost, a congressionally enacted question and
report period must not violate separation of powers as it relates
to legislative information gathering. The Court has made clear
that valid information requests are limited to areas where
Congress can constitutionally legislate.185 But because of the
broad scope of the legislative power to investigate,186 this requirement is a limitation in name only. For example, because
Congress has control over the purse strings of government, it
can inquire into any subject that involves the expenditure of
public funds.187 Congress could even inquire about a presidential pardon (a power exclusively vested in the President), assuming the pardon required appropriations for an amnesty
program.188 The broad legislative authority (and attendant inquiry power) is further expanded because the Court has never
required that a congressional inquiry actually produce legislation.189 To the contrary, “investigations may take researchers
184. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–25 (1997); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
185. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111–12 (1959); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927).
186. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
187. Landis, supra note 68, at 194.
188. FISHER, supra note 120, at 183.
189. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 177 (noting only that the investigation must be
related to an area on which Congress could legislate and “would be materially
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up ‘blind alleys’ and into nonproductive enterprises: ‘[t]o be a
valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end result.’”190
As a consequence, a question and report period relating
only to the areas where Congress could legislate can easily satisfy this first limitation. A question and report period is intimately related to Congress’s inquiry function—a function the
Court has repeatedly recognized as valid and expansive.191 As
for objections to a specific question on the basis that Congress
lacked authority to legislate in that area (thereby justifying a
refusal to answer), Congress can adopt a series of rules marking the boundaries of what subjects are proper during the question and report period. On this point, parliamentary practice is
instructive. Parliamentary systems have adopted rules limiting
the scope of questions—even without separation of powers considerations.192 To that end, Congress can declare some topics
(i.e., the President’s personal life, the appointment of officers,
military secrets) as outside the purview of the question and report period. Given the breadth of the legislative power, and
with some careful self-policing, Congress can create a question
and report period that is simultaneously useful as an information-gathering device and constitutionally compliant.
A properly crafted question and report period can also satisfy the second factor in the Supreme Court’s separation of
powers calculus: compulsion or arrogation of power. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Court upheld the legislative creation of a non-Article III judicial tribunal
for certain claimants in a series of cases involving securities
fraud.193 The Court stressed that “separation of powers concerns [were] diminished” because aggrieved individuals were
not compelled to appear before the tribunal.194 “[G]iven the degree of judicial control saved to the federal courts,” the Court
rejected a separation of powers challenge.195 Similarly, in Morrison, the Court cited absence of compulsion as one of the reaaided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit”); see
also Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (same).
190. FISHER, supra note 120, at 168 (quoting Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s
Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975)).
191. See, e.g., Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504; Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
192. See ERSKINE MAY’S TREATISE ON THE LAW, supra note 19, at 287–94.
193. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 842
(1986).
194. Id. at 855.
195. Id.
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sons why provisions of the Ethics in Government Act creating
an independent prosecutor passed constitutional muster.196
Assuming a question and report period would preserve an
executive official’s right to decline to answer a question, it
would not permit the legislative branch to control another
branch, and thus is acceptable, like the legislation affirmed in
Schor and Morrison.197 As in Schor and Morrison, Congress can
avoid allegations that it is impermissibly controlling the executive branch by permitting executive branch officials to refuse to
comply with congressional requests—namely, to refuse to answer oral or written questions. Furthermore, by adopting flexible rules for when executive officials appear, Congress could
minimize most, if not all, of any compulsion associated with the
question and report period. The only consequences for failure to
appear or for providing evasive answers would arise through
the normal political and budgeting processes. Finally, a question and report period is arguably less offensive to executive
control of information than extant statutory authority. Unlike
the Freedom of Information Act, for example, a question and
report period would impose no mandatory duty to disclose information. Because the question and report period need not exhibit any attempt to aggrandize legislative power by controlling
executive officials, it would not violate the separation of powers
principles set forth in Schor and Morrison.198
Lastly, a question and report period need not violate the
third main limitation on legislative conduct as it relates to
separation of powers: impairment of the executive branch’s constitutional functions.199 This functionalist balancing test
weighs the extent of impairment against the overriding need to
promote objectives assigned to the legislature by the Constitu-

196. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693–95 (1988).
197. In Bowsher v. Synar, the Court stated that the President is not accountable to the legislature except when she is impeached. 478 U.S. 714, 722
(1986). But this finding cannot reasonably be understood to abrogate Congress’s oversight function. Moreover, even in Bowsher, the Court took pains to
recognize the critical importance of the President’s accountability to the people. Id.
198. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 (noting that Congress had not violated
separation of powers because it could not compel the Attorney General to comply with its request); Schor, 478 U.S. at 727 (finding that the congressional
action in question did not pose a “dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions” by requiring compliance).
199. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711–12 (1974).
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tion.200 As discussed above, the Court has long recognized the
importance of Congress’s oversight function.201 Balanced
against this vital role, the executive branch has only a negligible dignity interest in refusing even to entertain congressional
questions.202 Stated differently, listening to questions, without
an obligation to answer, does not undermine constitutional
functions. And unlike the situations in Bowsher v. Synar or
INS v. Chadha, a question and report period would in no way
prevent the executive branch from exercising its constitutionally assigned function to execute the laws. The President still
would retain control over appointing and dismissing officials,
and would direct the extent to which the officials complied with
legislative information requests. Therefore, the question and
answer process would not interfere with the President’s ability
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”203 The core
executive functions would remain safely under executive control, and therefore a question and report period need not “intrude upon the central prerogatives of” the executive branch in
any significant way.204
Far from impairing executive functions, a question and report period might increase public awareness of and support for
executive policies in two principal ways. First, the period would
provide the President with another venue to convince the
American people (and their elected representatives) of the importance and superiority of her policies. Second, while the
President would not have the authority to ask questions of legislators, she could expect “friendly” questions from members of
her own party. These friendly questions would ensure that the
President is not faced with an entirely hostile environment. In
these ways, a question and report period might actually increase executive influence at the expense of the legislature.

200. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 443; United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. at 711–12.
201. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 (describing Congress’s investigatory/oversight function as “incidental to the legislative function”); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957) (“[A]n investigation is part of lawmaking. It is justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process.”).
202. Congress has long recognized (and accommodated) this interest. See,
e.g., S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 7 (1881) (“The committee ventures again to repeat
that the effect of the bill does not seek to—and will not—aggrandize or impair
the executive power as defined in the Constitution and vested in the President.”).
203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
204. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996).
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To be sure, a question and report period might physically
tie up an official for a few hours per month—arguably impairing the official’s other constitutional duties during that limited
time. But a congressional request that an executive official
spend a morning on Capitol Hill is far different from an attempt to create a quasi-executive administrator of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (as in Bowsher205) or
to veto executive branch conduct (as in Chadha206). Even assuming the question period burdens a cabinet official, the importance of the question and report period should take precedence.207 Congress could even mitigate these concerns by
appropriating additional funding, thereby ensuring that cabinet officials have sufficient staff to respond to and prepare for
the legislative inquiries.208 Congress could further ameliorate
concerns about impairment of constitutional duties by creating
a series of flexible rules for physical appearances. These rules
might include limitations on the number or length of an official’s appearances. They might also create a series of exceptions
allowing the official, for example, to skip the question period in
cases of emergency or unavoidable conflict. These steps would
preempt executive branch arguments of infringement.
These minor infringements on executive functions are balanced, in accordance with the Court’s calculus in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, against numerous important
legislative interests and objectives.209 This Note has discussed
these interests in detail above, but they are all intimately related to Congress’s inquiry power. They include making in-

205. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S 714, 734 (1986) (“By placing the responsibility for execution of the . . . Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to
removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the executive function. The Constitution
does not permit such intrusion.”).
206. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983) (“Disagreement with the
Attorney General’s decision on Chadha’s deportation—that is, Congress’ decision to deport Chadha—no less than Congress’ original choice to delegate to
the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President.”).
207. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 8 (1881) (describing cabinet official
testimony as outweighing “the harassing cares of distributing clerkships and
closely supervising the mere machinery of the departments”).
208. Id. (describing a willingness to increase agency budgets to free up
cabinet officials).
209. 433 U.S. 425, 452–54 (1977).
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formed public policy decisions and crafting cogent legislation,210
exercising effective oversight of executive programs,211 and disseminating information to the public.212 The Court has also recognized that Congress, in addition to acquiring information to
create public policy and crafting remedial legislation, has an interest to help “restore public confidence in our political process[
].”213 A public debate about the most important issues of the
day would directly effectuate all of these interests. Congress’s
inquiry power is much more central to these core responsibilities than is the President’s interest in avoiding the indignity of
answering questions for a short period of time each month. Because a question and report period need not violate the fundamental separation of powers principles underlying the constitutional scheme, it could serve as “proper” exercise of legislative
authority.
b. Executive Privilege
While related to separation of powers, executive privilege
presents an independent challenge to the constitutionality of a
question and report period. It does so in two primary ways.
First, the executive branch could argue that the entire question
and report regime is not constitutionally proper because it conflicts with a generalized executive privilege. Second, executive
privilege may be invoked so often that it renders the question
and report period ineffective. In light of Supreme Court precedent, a well crafted question and report period could overcome
both of these objections.
One foreseeable executive branch response to a question
and report period is to refuse to comply in any form under a
generalized assertion of privilege. In essence, the President
could argue that the mere existence of the question and report
period violates executive branch privileges. In United States v.
Nixon, the Court confronted a similar issue, namely, whether a
“generalized” executive interest in privilege would trump a specific judicial interest in the “fair administration of criminal jus210. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (“[Congress] cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.”).
211. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 167, at 2343 (“[A] crucial part of
Congress’s job is keeping the Executive accountable.”).
212. Cf. WILSON, supra note 158, at 303 (“The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.”).
213. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 453.
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tice.”214 In answering that question in the negative, the Court
noted that while the President’s need for confidentiality is “general in nature,” the need for the production of evidence is “specific and central to the fair . . . administration of justice.”215
Just as the acquisition of evidence is critical to the judicial
function, the acquisition of information is central to the legislative function.216 A question and report period is a proper exercise of legislative power because it serves as a critical means—
much like the judicial subpoena—to acquire information.
To be sure, there are differences between a narrowly tailored subpoena (as in United States v. Nixon217) and a broad
question and report period. But a question and report period
would not violate executive privilege any more than the mere
issuance of a judicial subpoena in United States v. Nixon. If
anything, a question and report period is less onerous than the
judicial (or congressional) subpoena because it is not compulsory. The question and report period’s constitutional saving
grace is its lack of compulsion. It bears repeating that the executive branch could refuse to answer questions based on executive privilege or otherwise. In short, a generally asserted
executive privilege does not convert a question and answer period into an improper exercise of legislative power.
The second likely argument is that the question and report
period would infringe the President’s right to assert executive
privilege even on narrower grounds. The Court in United States
v. Nixon cautiously stated that, although Nixon’s generalized
interest was insufficient to defeat a subpoena, the privilege did
protect certain communications.218 However, Congress could
avoid the assertion that the question and report period is altogether improper through careful formulation and administration of the period. For example, to steer clear of executive privilege issues, Congress could simply follow the path of least
214. 418 U.S. 683, 711–12 (1974).
215. Id. at 712–13.
216. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 197 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
217. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706–07 (noting that the subpoena
did not violate a “need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets” and would be conducted in camera “with all the protection that
a district court will be oblidged to provide” to protect confidentiality).
218. Id. at 705 (“[There is a] valid need for protection of communications
between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in
the performance of their manifold duties.”).
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resistance: acknowledge the viability of a limited executive
privilege. If Congress recognized in the statute authorizing a
question and report period the right of executive officials to refuse to answer questions on narrow privilege grounds, it could
outflank executive branch assertions that the question and report period violates executive privilege. By recognizing the executive branch official’s limited right to refuse to answer, a
question and report period and executive privilege could coexist
in constitutional harmony.
Not only would Congressional acquiescence with executive
privilege disarm the executive branch of one possible challenge,
it also would not substantially undermine the efficacy and purpose of a question and report period. To ensure some responsiveness from executive officials, Congress could look to other,
non-coercive enforcement mechanisms. As parliamentary practice—even without the doctrine of executive privilege—
demonstrates, substantively deficient answers do not go unpunished. Refusing to answer a question or providing indirect answers “can, in [its] own way, shed just as much light on government policy (or the lack of it) in a particular area as a full
and detailed response, which in practice may conceal more than
it reveals.”219 In the United States, the public would likely view
a refusal to answer or invocation of executive privilege as an
admission of liability.220 In addition to facing public suspicion, a
recalcitrant executive official could be punished for her failure
to answer questions through other legislative mechanisms. For
instance, Congress’s power of the purse is particularly well
suited to ensure executive branch compliance—without abridging executive privilege.221 Congress could refuse to act on the
219. ADAM TOMKINS, THE CONSTITUTION AFTER SCOTT: GOVERNMENT UN99 (1998); see also Giddings, supra note 154, at 136 (“[G]enerally
speaking, ministers prefer to answer if they can—not least because it looks
better from a public relations viewpoint, and . . . a refusal may offend.”).
220. Marshall, supra note 82, at 811 (“Because the press (and to a lesser
extent, the Congress) equates a claim of executive privilege with that of a
cover-up, the result is that the claim of executive privilege has become a political liability to the President who invokes it. In fact, its invocation is often so
damaging to a President that forcing the President to claim it can mark the
victory of his opponents by itself.”).
221. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (describing Congress’s power of
the purse as particularly well suited to monitor the “wisdom and soundness of
Executive action”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison), supra note 43,
at 394 (“This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance,
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President’s legislative agenda as it relates to the question proffered. And for truly serious matters, a question and report period would not abrogate Congress’s subpoena and impeachment
functions. Evasive answers or excessive invocations of executive privilege would rightly place the executive official between
the Scylla of public scorn and suspicion and the Charybdis of
damaged congressional relations.
B. THE STATE OF THE UNION CLAUSE AS A SOURCE FOR A
QUESTION AND REPORT PERIOD
In addition to the Necessary and Proper Clause, the State
of the Union Clause presents a supplemental constitutional
foundation for a question and report period. Despite its infrequent judicial treatment as a constitutional source of power,
the clause supports a more robust executive branch disclosure
requirement. Given Congress’s substantial interest in access to
executive branch information and agency oversight, a statutory
question and report period would closely conform to the broader
purposes of the State of the Union Clause.
In his treatise on the Constitution, Justice Story described
the clause as a manifestation of the importance of executivelegislative information sharing.222 “There is great wisdom,”
Story emphasized, “in not merely allowing, but in requiring, the
president to lay before congress all facts and information,
which may assist in their deliberations; and in enabling him at
once to point out the evil and to suggest the remedy.”223 The
State of the Union Clause demonstrates the President’s responsibility “not merely for a due administration of the existing systems, but for due diligence and examination into the means of
improving them.”224 Story’s commentary supports a question
and report period in at least two ways: (1) the President’s obligation to engage Congress in a direct and bilateral manner, and
(2) the importance of the President’s ongoing role in that regard. To these ends, the actions of the first Congress are again
illustrative. In coupling an ongoing obligation of the Treasury
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.”); Kate Stith,
Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1356 (1988)
(“[A]ppropriations do not merely set aside particular amounts of money; they
define the character, extent, and scope of authorized activities.”).
222. 2 STORY, supra note 29, § 1561, at 417 (describing the importance and
validity of the State of the Union Clause as “above all real objection”).
223. Id. § 1561, at 418 (emphasis added).
224. Id.
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Secretary to disclose information to Congress with the Act creating the Treasury Department,225 the first Congress “followed
the furrow plowed by the . . . State of the Union clause.”226 Notwithstanding its infrequent judicial treatment, the State of the
Union Clause envisioned an extensive and continuing role for
the executive branch in the legislative process.
The reality of early congressional practice further supports
a pragmatic and broader view of the State of the Union Clause.
The Constitution’s text mandates only one congressional session per year and does not describe its length.227 While the importance of an open and accessible executive branch has been
important from the Founding, the reality was that the early
legislative branch convened infrequently because of geographic
considerations.228 Although the prospect of an absentee Congress is unlikely in the modern era, in the early days of the Republic “Americans expected that [federal] legislators would
typically meet in short sessions and quickly return back home
to live (like everyone else) under the laws just made.”229 The
President, on the other hand, was always on duty.230 Because of
this early practice, Congress needed immediate, extensive, and
continuing contact with the executive branch in order to remain
apprised of issues of national importance.
Moreover, the clause goes further than the British custom
(with the King’s yearly speech to Parliament) by mandating executive branch disclosures “from time to time.”231 Noting the
impossibility of identifying every time when the duty would be

225. An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, 1 Stat. 65, 65–66
(1789).
226. BERGER, supra note 68, at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall assemble at least
once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.”), amended by U.S.
CONST. amend. XX, § 2 (changing the meeting date to “the 3d day of January”).
228. Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 125–28 (1995); Ruth C. Silva,
The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 47 MICH. L. REV. 451, 452 n.4 (1949)
(describing nine-month lapses in congressional sessions).
229. Amar & Amar, supra note 228, at 126.
230. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and
Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 713 (1995)
(“Unlike federal lawmakers and judges, the President is at ‘Session’ twentyfour hours a day, every day. Constitutionally speaking, the President never
sleeps.”); Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 88, at 29–32.
231. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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required, Kesavan and Sidak have persuasively posited that
the phrase “from time to time,” should be understood as something “more than ‘at least once during every session of Congress.’”232 It is difficult to imagine, given the early irregularity
of legislative sessions and the exigencies of national government, that a single annual message “exhaust[s] the duty to
furnish information ‘from time to time.’”233 Moreover, if the
Framers truly envisaged a yearly speech, they could have easily drafted language more clearly reflecting this less onerous
presidential duty.
Some commentators have argued that the State of the Union Clause did not authorize Congress to compel executive
branch dialogue and information sharing.234 However, the fact
that the State of the Union Clause imposes an affirmative duty
on the President—and does not explicitly confer power on Congress—is not fatal to a broader understanding of the clause. As
an initial matter, the Supreme Court has long recognized that
one who is owed a duty has a correlative right to require performance of the duty.235 As Professor Berger posited, “what the
President is under a duty to furnish to Congress ‘from time to
time’ could be requested at its convenience.”236 At least one
nineteenth-century lawmaker also mentioned this view of the
State of the Union Clause.237
Kesavan and Sidak disagreed with this understanding of
the clause, arguing that the clause did “not signify any kind of
congressional prerogative. [It did] not provide that ‘Congress
232. Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 88, at 16. (“The phrase is to be interpreted flexibly because it was impossible for the Framers to specify all of the
times that would give rise to the duty of the clauses.”).
233. BERGER, supra note 68, at 38.
234. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 91, at 1207 n.262 (“The State
of the Union Clause . . . imposes an obligation on the President only ‘from time
to time’ and only on general matters such as the circumstances of the whole
country. This Clause gives Congress no power to require presidential opinions
in writing upon any subject relating to the President’s duties, because the
Clause governs information exchanges between two independent and co-equal
departments of the national government.”); Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 88,
at 7–8 (arguing that Berger’s reading is “textually awkward and wrong”).
235. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
236. BERGER, supra note 68, at 37 (emphasis in original).
237. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 482 (1842) (statement of Rep.
Cushing) (“The clause requiring the President to see to the execution of the
laws, and to give information to Congress of the state of the Union, was imperative on the President, and constituted an obligation, by the omission of
which he violated the Constitution and his oath of office, and was liable to impeachment.”).
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may from time to time require the President to give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union.’”238 Yet, even assuming the validity of this reading, the State of the Union
Clause can still justify a question and report period. Assuming
it does not require the President to give Congress information
through a coercive mechanism, a question and report period
safely falls within the clause’s scope because it fulfills its other
underlying purposes (i.e., access to information, dialogue, and
government transparency). The lack of compulsion demonstrates that a question and report period can coexist with even
Kesavan and Sidak’s narrow textual analysis of the State of the
Union Clause.
Similarly, Calabresi and Rhodes’s dismissal of the State of
the Union Clause does not fatally weaken the clause’s role as a
supporting source for a question and report period. In their zeal
to nullify any congressional interference with executive branch
functions, Calabresi and Rhodes failed to justify their limited
understanding of the clause. For example, they argued that the
clause requires the President to discuss “general matters”
only.239 This reading is not textually self evident,240 and it was
repudiated in the early years of the Republic.241 Second, a question and report period would not give Congress the power to
“require presidential opinions in writing upon any subject.”242
Congress could only ask the executive branch for information in
those areas in which Congress could legislate—and even then,
the executive branch’s compliance would be voluntary. Finally,
even assuming the validity of a more limited view of the State
of the Union Clause, a question and report period lacking a
compulsive mechanism (e.g., the contempt sanction) would not
require anything from the executive branch. Although a
healthy (if undeveloped) debate exists about the State of the
Union Clause’s meaning, the clause not only encourages
238. Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 88, at 7 (emphasis added).
239. Id.
240. It is not necessarily true that, because informing Congress about the
“state of the union” is a broad topic, the President is limited to a superficial or
generalized message. An equally plausible reading is that the clause envisions
the President providing specific details about a wide variety of important issues and enactments of the day.
241. 2 STORY, supra note 29, § 1561, at 417–18 (describing the President’s
unique knowledge of a variety of subjects, including the “true workings of the
laws . . . of trade, finance, and . . . justice; . . . and the military, naval, and civil
establishments of the union”).
242. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 91, at 1207 n.262.
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greater executive-legislative dialogue, but also imposes reciprocal duties on the President to disclose, and the Congress to inquire.243 A question and report period would facilitate both of
these obligations.
IV. THE CORE CHARACTERISTICS OF A LIMITED
QUESTION AND REPORT PERIOD
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that crafting a constitutional question and report period is no small task. There
are many procedural and substantive details of a question and
report period that warrant further study. The purpose of this
Note, however, is not to devise each provision of a question and
report period, but instead to demonstrate the constitutional validity of the general endeavor. Notwithstanding this modest
purpose, it is possible to sketch broadly the basic provisions of a
question and report period in the United States.
Generally, a question and report period would share many
of the British and Canadian provisions. This premise relies on
a recognition of the relative success of Question Time in those
countries qua accountability guarantor and informationgathering mechanism. It also acknowledges the common law
traditions those countries share with the United States. Constitutionally, there is little difference for purposes of a question
and report period between confirmable cabinet officials and the
President. Therefore, a question and report period could involve
cabinet officials as well as the President. It could take place in
a joint session of Congress, or separately in either house.
As with the British custom, a question and report period in
the United States could take either (or both) of two forms: written and oral questions. In the written component, legislators
could ask an unlimited number of written questions, addressed
to the executive official who is responsible to the subject matter
of the question. The President or cabinet official would respond,
if at all, by way of publication of both the question and the answer in the Federal Register (or some other publication). Resembling the practice in parliamentary systems (but for different reasons, namely separation of powers and executive
privilege), a member of Congress would have no formal enforcement mechanism for an executive official’s failure to respond to a written question.

243. BERGER, supra note 68, at 38.
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In the oral component of the question and answer regime,
individual members of Congress could ask the President and
cabinet level officials direct questions for a specified amount of
time each month (e.g., one to two hours). To facilitate this exchange, Congress would promulgate a series of rules apportioning time equally between the minority and majority parties, describing the form and mode of questions, and determining
which members of each party are allowed to ask questions. Answers (and questions) would be published in the Congressional
Record. As with written questions, the separation of powers
and executive privilege doctrines would limit the scope of the
oral questions to preserve executive branch prerogatives. For
example, a question must be related to a subject on which Congress could legislate. Further, the executive official would not
be under oath and would retain, on privilege grounds or otherwise, the right to not answer a question altogether. There could
be no judicial sanction for failure to respond. As discussed
above, excessive refusals to answer or failure to appear would
expose the executive official to political and policy consequences.
CONCLUSION
Transparency, accountability, and the primacy of Congress
are essential components of the U.S. constitutional structure.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 these traits have atrophied. A question and report period is a modest—and constitutional—step toward restoring those foundational attributes of
American democracy.
A legislatively mandated executive branch question and
report period is neither new nor revolutionary. It is also not a
panacea to remedy the expansion of executive power and the
growth of the administrative bureaucracy; crafting a question
and report period that concurrently complies with separation of
powers while also remaining an effective tool will be difficult.
And there may be logistical problems during its implementation. Despite these challenges, this Note demonstrates not only
that a question and report period is compatible with the U.S.
political system, but also that such an effort is worth renewed
attention in Congress and in legal scholarship. To improve government in the post-9/11 world, Congress should look to a decidedly pre-9/11 mechanism: the question and report period.

